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PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE POTENTIAL
LIABILITY OF THE ADVERTISING AGENCY
STEPHEN J. WERBER* AND WILLIAM L. TROMBETTA**
M ADISON AVENUE WAS STUNNED when the Supreme Court ruled in
1965 on a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenge to a television
commercial which purported to show the "sandpaper shaving" ability of
Colgate-Palmolive's Rapid Shave.' The court held that even though
Rapid Shave would soften sandpaper enough to make it possible to
"shave" it, the advertisement was deceptive in that a plexiglass mock-up,
which was purported to be the real thing, was used on television.2 The
holding was controversial and widely criticized, 3 but one aspect of the
decision stirred little debate: the FTC was held to have properly joined
both Colgate-Palmolive and its advertising agency, Ted Bates & Co., Inc.,
in the cease and desist order.
4
The Supreme Court's stamp of approval was thus placed on the prin-
ciple established by the court of appeals decision in the same case three
years before: that federal regulators were free to move directly against
the advertising agency where false and deceptive advertising was sus-
pected. 5 A similar result was reached in 1963, when the court of appeals
approved the joinder of the advertising agency which prepared commer-
B.A., Adelphi University; J.D., Cornell University; LL.M., New York University; Mem-
ber, New York Bar; Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law.
B.S., St. Joseph's College; M.B.A., Temple University; Ph.D., Chico State University;
Assistant Professor of Marketing, School of Management, Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Harold W. Fuson, Jr. of the Cleveland State
Law Review for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
Id. at 385-86. The challenged commercial purported to show a piece of sandpaper
being smoothly shaved almost immediately after being coated with Rapid Shave. In
fact, what the viewer saw was a specially prepared piece of plexiglass. Id. at 376.
Rapid Shave will allow sandpaper to be "shaved," but it requires a soaking time of about
80 minutes and real sandpaper would appear on television as only plain, colored paper.
Id. at 376-77.
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 185 (1965); Note, 7
B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 170 (1965); 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 362 (1965).
4 FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 370, 394-95 (1965).
5 Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 1962). The court warned:
we think there may well be a distinction between a principal and an agent in the
permissible scope of an order. In some degree a principal may well be held to
advertise at his peril. But we have reservations as to how far it is appropriate
to go in the case of an agent, in the absence, at least, of any suspicion on its
part that the advertisement is false. Id. at 95.
The FTC had joined other advertising agencies in cease and desist orders in the past and
the legality of so doing had apparently gone largely unquestioned. Ted Bates & Co.,
for example, was named in two such orders in 1960: Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
56 F.T.C. 956 (1960); Standard Brands, Inc., 56 F.T.C. 1491 (1960).
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cials for Rise shaving cream, although the Commission's order was set
aside on other grounds.6 In a decision which carefully detailed the depth
of the agency's involvement in the deception, both agency and manu-
facturer were successfully joined in an attack by the FTC on the market-
ing scheme operated on behalf of Sucrets throat lozenges.
7
I. A CASE FOR EXTENDING LIABILITY
If the advertising agency is a proper target for the federal agency
charged with protecting the consumer, why not for the consumer him-
self? Where the consumer relies to his detriment on a representation in
an advertisement prepared by an agency, what is to keep him from suing
the agency if injury results? For over ten years these questions have
gone unanswered.
The consumer may desire to include the advertising agency as a de-
fendant in a products liability action for a number of reasons. These in-
clude: the agency may be more economically attractive than its client;
the activity giving rise to liability may have been the agency's "over-
promotion," whether deliberate or negligent, rather than any act or omis-
sion of the client;' and the agency may be more attractive for jurisdic-
tional or choice of law reasons.9
Product liability law varies widely from forum to forum.' 0 So also
do choice of law rules." A plaintiff will naturally seek the forum
6 Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963). The court stated that the
criterion for determining whether to hold the agency responsible "should be the extent
to which the advertising agency actually participated in the deception" and concluded
that the "agency here was deeply involved." Id. at 534. The court cited these factors
as evidence of the agency's involvement: the agency worked for years with Carter and
handled the Rise account, even before the product had a name; it was the agency's idea to
push the "wetness approach" in advertising Rise; and the agency concurred with
Carter on the motif of the program, wrote the storyboards and assigned the job to the
film producer. Id.
7 Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1968),
affirming Quinton Co., 69 F.T.C. 526 (1966). The court agreed that the staudan'd should
be as stated in Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963), and concluded
that the "advertising agency actually participated in the deception." Id. at 928.
s For example, "over-pronotion" by drug company salesmen has led to liability of the
manufacturer ,vhere the drug was prescribed improperly despite adequate warnings in
the printed literature accompanying the drug. Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282
A.2d 206 (1971); Love v. Wolf, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967).
9 It is true that a wise agency will contract any increased liability back to its client - but
that fact does not weaken the consumer's interest in joining the agency. If the client is
insolvent, no amount of contractual shuffling will help the agency. If the client is
solvent, the agency's own culpability or jurisdictional and choice of law advantages
may still motivate the consumer to join the agency even though the client may ulti-
mately pay the judgement.
10 Strict liability in tort is accepted in most jurisdictions, but the highest courts of at least
eight states have not yet accepted the doctrine and in several others the highest court
has accepted only the related theory of strict liability in warranty. 1 CCH PRoD. LIAB.
REP. 4050, 4060 (1974).
11 Compare Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974); Schwartz v. Con-
solidated Freightways Corp., - Minn. - 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974); Schlitz v. Meyer,
20 Ohio St. 2d 169, 280 N.E.2d 925 (1972); with Heidmann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250,
194 N.W.2d 164 (1972); St. Pierre v. St. Pierre, 158 Conn. 620, 262 A.2d 185 (1969);
[Vol. 24:413
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where the law likely to be applied will be most favorable and the level of
recovery will likely be the highest. The presence of additional defendants
may increase the number of forums from which the plaintiff may choose.
There are also public policy reasons for increasing the scope of agency
liability; by providing the possibility of an additional solvent defendant,
an expansion of agency liability would help to further spread the risk
occasioned by dangerous consumer products and although increased
agency liability may lead as much to an increase in vapidity as to an in-
crease in responsible advertising, 2 it would certainly increase the pres-
sure on agencies to avoid overselling products and to be more selective
in the advertisers and products they choose to promote.
3
Consider the following hypothetical situation. An independent adver-
tising agency has been commissioned to research the market for a pain
reliever and to design a promotional campaign for the drug manufac-
turer. The manufacturer has provided the agency with laboratory test
results which indicate that the product is usually safe and effective for its
intended purpose, namely relief from minor headache and muscle pain.
The laboratory tests further show, however, that the drug may have daan-
gerous side effects, particularly for pregnant women. The advertising
agency promotes the drug as "super-safe" and the "best product on the
market for relief from pain." The advertisement also makes the claim
that the drug is "virtually free from side effects." 4  A pregnant womlan
notices the advertisement, purchases the product, consumes it, and short-
ly thereafter suffers the loss of her baby. Assuming that the wonlan can
prove that the drug caused the loss of the baby, there is little doubt that
the manufacturer would be held liable.
Although the manufacturer could be held liable, under theories such
as negligence, warranty, strict liability, and deceit, 15 the assemblers,
component suppliers, wholesalers and retailers could also be held liable.
16
Curiously missing from the list of defendants has been the advertising
agency whose job it is to educate the buyer about the product and to in-
Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271 (1968) on the issue of modern choice of law
theory versus the traditional approach. See also Kuehne, Choice of Latw in Products
Liability, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1972).
,2 In most, if not all cases, there would have to be a showing that the injured consumier
reasonably relied on an advertisement before the agency could be held liable. Thus, the
more rational and informative an advertisement is, the more reasonable will be the
reliance. For example, Sunoco's innocuous suggestion that the use of its products will
"turn winter into summer," contains no facts upon \%-hich a consumer could reasonably
rely. A Sunoco "I can be very friendly" advertisement which implies that your friendly\
Sunoco dealer knows your driving habits and stands as a monitor of your car's driving
condition, however, may go far enough to support a claim of detrimental reliance if a
consumer's car Were to pass violently from the friendly Sunoco station into a neighbor's
yard as a result of a blow-out caused by bald tires.
13 G. HOTCHKISS, AN OUTLINE OF ADVERTISINC 38 (3rd ed. 1950).
4 An additional interesting variation on this hypothetical might be to assume that the
manufacturer had placed a prominent warning on the package which the woman did
not notice in her rush to obtain relief.
,5 See generally \W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 96-98 (4th ed. 1971).
'6 Id. at § 100.
19751
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duce him to buy and use it. The authors have been unable to find a
single reported case in which an advertising agency has been joined as
defendant in a products liability action. That the agencies' merciful free-
dom from such actions should not last forever becomes apparent from
an examination of the integral role the agency plays in the marketing
process.
II. THE ADVERTISING AGENCY'S MARKETING ROLE
As a result of the agency's activity, a product generally enjoys greater
sales than it would experience without the agency's involvement. 7 For
many products, particularly undifferentiated products like toothpaste
or aspirin, advertising is likely to be the single most significant factor
in the consumer's choice of one product over another.' Often, a manu-
facturer entrusts a good deal of the entire marketing effort as well as the
promotional responsibility to the agency. Most larger agencies offer a
veritable smorgasbord of services in addition to advertising, such as mar-
keting research, media analysis, market testing, product testing and con-
cept testing. 19 In short, the agency, not the manufacturer or retailer,
often has actual control of most aspects of the marketing process and
has a range of discretion which goes far beyond simply preparing the text
or film needed to illustrate the products' attributes.
20
A case involving the deceptive advertising of Sucrets throat lozenges
2
'
aptly illustrates the agency's typical role. The manufacturer (Merck &
Co.) entered an agreement with the advertising agency (Doherty, Clif-
ford, S.teers & Shenfield, Inc.) in which Merck retained a veto power
but which obligated the agency to do, among other things:
a. Study the products assigned by Merck, and the market
for those products.
b. Examine marketing opportunities for new products.
c. Make recommendations covering development and pro-
motion of new products.
d. Offer general marketing consultation for both new and
existing products.
22
17 P. CONVERSE, H. HuEGY & R. MITCHELL, ELEMENTS OF MARKETING 494 (7th ed. 1965);
E. MCCARTHY, BASIC MARKETING 404 (5th ed. 1975).
18 P. KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT: ANALYSIS, PLANNING AND CONTROL 43-65, 452-
54 (1st ed. 1967). See also Smith, Product Differentiation and Market Segmentation
of Alternative Marketing Strategies, 21 J. OF MARKETING 3 (1956).
19 See generally S. DUNN & A. BARRAN, ADVERTISING: ITS ROLE IN MODERN BUSINESS
135-38 (3rd ed. 1974).
20 In a seminal article on advertising agencies, T. A. Wise said of the former chief executive
of one leading agency, Interpublic, "'[Marion] Harper believed that Interpublic should
have the talent and means to advise clients not only on how to advertise but on what
product to make, where to make it, how to price it, and how to stimilate the sales
organization," Wise, The Coup d'Etat at Interpublic, FORTUNE, Feb. 1968, at 136.
21 Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1968).
22 Quinton Co., 69 F.T.C. 526, 534 (1966). Merck used the same Quinton Co. in manu-
facturing Sucrets.
[Vol. 24:413
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Pursuant to the agreement, the agency prepared a document entitled
"Proposed 1962 Marketing Plan Sucrets Antiseptic Lozenges,"23 and as
the FTC noted:
This advertising was aimed primarily at "self-medicating con-
sumers" who, according to the agency, "depend upon advertis-
ing for product information, not upon the druggist or the physi-
cian." These consumers were regarded as "confused" and as
"neither well-informed nor well-trained." The agency also
believed that a " 'sore throat' is a real disease to consumers" and




The FTC found, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that the advertising
agency was primarily responsible for the deceptive advertising since the
agency had expertise in the area.25  In cases where the agency's role is
so prominent, it would not seem unreasonable for a court in a products
liability action to find more than just an incidental relationship con-
necting client, agency and consumer.
In addition to the FTC deceptive advertising cases, 26 two other anal-
ogous areas provide precedents which are potentially useful in building a
case for agency liability: the independent testing agency experience and
the independent accountant experience.
III. THE INDEPENDENT TESTINc AGENCY EXPERIENCE
When an organization such as Good Housekeeping or Underwriters
Laboratory confers its endorsement on a product, consumers tend to
rely upon this certification as a reflection of quality.2 7  To the extent
that a manufacturer is able to incorporate the certification in his promo-
tion, the endorsement becomes a form of advertising. Perhaps the most
interesting case involving a testing agency is Hanberry v. Hearst.
28
The plaintiff, Mrs. Hanberry, purchased a pair of shoes from a retailer.
23 Substantial portions of the document appear as an appendix to the court of appeals
decision at 392 F.2d at 931-34.
24 69 F.T.C. at 559 n.13.
25 392 F.2d at 928, n.4 where the court quoted approvingly the FTC finding that:
The agency, more so than its principal, should have known whether the adver-
tisements had the capacity to mislead or deceive the public. This is an area in
which the agency has expertise.
26 E.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965); Doherty, Clifford, Steers &
Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1968); Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 323
F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962).
27 Attesting to the effectiveness of this type of advertising, a study conducted by the New
York City Department of Consumer Affairs found that the seals of such organizations as
Good Housekeeping and Parents' Magazine are "'highly prized by the public." State-
ment by the Hon. Bess Myerson Grant, Commissioner of the Department of Consumer
Affairs of the City of New York, at 7 Hearings Before the National Commission on
Product Safety, 32, 34 (1969). The study appears as an appendix to Mrs. Grant's
testimony at 40-45.
2' 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 181 (1971).
Another leading testing agency case is Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp.,
269 F. Supp. 109 (D. Del. 1967) (Underwriters Laboratory listing of fire extinguisher).
1975]
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Soon after the purchase, wearing the shoes, she slipped on the vinyl
floor of her kitchen and sustained severe injuries. She claimed that a de-
fect in the shoes was the cause of the fall. 29 In addition to the retailer
and wholesaler, Mrs. Hanberry joined the Hearst Corporation (publisher
of Good Housekeeping) in her action for %damages, stating that she had
relied upon the Good Housekeeping seal in selecting the shoes.3 0
The court held in Hanberry that the plaintiff's complaint had set forth
a cause of action against Hearst on the theory of negligent misrepre-
sentation and that Hearst was under a duty to exercise ordinary care in
issuing its seal.31 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited with ap-
proval Section 311 of the Second Restatement of Torts.32  The Restate-
ment's focus is on the reliance upon the information, 33 not necessarily
the source. Thus the Restatement position could apply to a publicly
known organization such as Good Housekeeping as well as to an unknown
advertising agency.
Hanberry raised two other points with respect to Hearst's liability for
negligent misrepresentation. First, the court brushed aside the conten-
tion that Hearst was only stating an opinion upon which the plaintiff had
no right to rely in that the corporation "represented to the public it
possessed superior knowledge and special information .... "31 Second,
and perhaps more disturbing for advertising agencies, is the court's
statement of the issue presented:
The basic question presented on this appeal is whether one who
endorses a product for his own economic gain, and for the pur-
pose of encouraging and inducing the public to buy it, may be
liable to a purchaser who, relying on the endorsement, buys the
product and is injured because it is defective and not as repre-
sented in the endorsement. We conclude such liability may
exist . . . . In arriving at this conclusion, we are influenced
more by public policy than by whether such cause of action can
29 Id. at 682, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
30 Id. To enhance the magazine's appeal to advertisers, Hearst issues the seal to its
advertisers. The seal is called the "Good Housekeeping Consumers' Guaranty Seal"
and is accompanied by the certification, "We have satisfied ourselves the products and
services advertised in Good Housekeeping are good ones and the advertising claims
made for them in our magazine are truthful." Id. at 683, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
31 Id. at 685, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
32 Id. at 685 n.1, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 523 n.1.
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 311 (1965).
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability
for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance
upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third person as the actor should expect to be put in peril by
the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated. (Emphasis added).
3 276 Cal. App. 2d at 686, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
[Vol. 24:413
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be comfortably fitted into one of the law's traditional categories
of liability.3 5
Again, the difference between Good Housekeeping and the agency is
that the consumer identifies the former while the latter's existence re-
mains obscured. The agency's role, however, is really no different than
Good Housekeeping's promotion of the product. If the words "promotes"
and "promotion" are substituted for "endorses" and "endorsement," the
applicability of the court's language in Hanberry to advertising agencies
becomes clear. Suppose that instead of relying upon the Good House-
keeping Seal, Mrs. Hanberry had relied upon a televised advertisement
in which a cartoon character busily did housework while lauding the shoes
as a boon to foot comfort and safety. Would the agency which created
the cartoon character and which in fact had itself identified foot comfort
and safety during housework as an important promotional factor be some-
how less responsible for Mrs. Hanberry's accident than Hearst, which had
only warranted that the shoes were a "good product"? The important
factor upon which liability should hinge is the extent of the agency's par-
ticipation in the marketing process and its resulting responsibility for the
consumer's decision to acquire the product and to use it in the manner
which caused the injury.
While upholding Mrs. Hanberry's right to press her cause of action
in negligent misrepresentation against Hearst, the court in Hanberry
declined to apply a strict liability or warranty theory against Hearst. The
rationale was to protect Hearst from liability for a defectively made prod-
uct as distinct from a flaw permeating the entire product line. 36  Sig-
nificantly, the validity of this rationale was questioned in a later Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals decision:
Where it can be established that the defendant by its avowed
testing was the responsible inducement for the purchase by
plaintiff, we see no reason to hold that defendant was not a nec-
essary instrument in the stream of commerce.3 7
The key question in a strict liability or warranty action should be:
Is the agency, to borrow Chief Justice Traynor's phraseology in Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co.,35 "an integral part of the overall producing
and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting
35 Id. at 683, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
36 The court noted that
[a]pplication of either warranty or strict liability in tort would subject respondent
to liability even if the general design and material used in making this brand of
shoes were good, but the particular pair became defective through some mishap
in the manufacturing process. We believe this kind of liability for individually
defective items should be limited to those directly involved in the manufacturing
and supplying process, and should not be extended through warranty or strict
liability to a general endorser who makes no representation it has examined or
tested each item marketed. Id. at 687, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
37 Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 726-27, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 324
(1972).
a 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964).
1975]
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from defective products"? 3 9  Significantly, the Vandermark case ex-
tended strict liability to a retailer whose own culpability for the defect
was minor at best. Justice Traynor rationalized the decision in these
terms:
Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in the business of dis-
tributing goods to the public. They are an integral part of the
overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products. In some cases
the retailer may be the only member of the enterprise reason-
ably available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer
himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the product
is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manu-
facturer to that end; the retailer's strict liability thus serves as
an added incentive to safety.40
The same terms can be shown to apply in many cases to the advertising
agency as well as to the retailer. Agencies are in business to foster the
distribution of goods. While they may not physically handle the goods,
their activities are often more important in placing the goods in the hands
of a consumer than the activities of anyone else. In some cases, to para-
phrase Justice Traynor, the agency may be the only one reasonably avail-
able to the injured plaintiff. While the agency may not physically affect
the product's safety, its activities may determine the manner in which
the product is used by the plaintiff. Certainly, the agency, as well as
the retailer, is in a position to put pressure on the advertiser (e.g., by
not handling the account) to produce a safe product. The end result:
the agency's strict liability would serve as an added incentive to safety.
IV. THE INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANT EXPERIENCE
Just as advertising agencies often rely on information submitted by
their clients in preparing promotional campaigns, accounting firms also
rely on information compiled by their clients in preparing reports or
audits. There is a substantial body of law surrounding the responsibility
of accountants for the accuracy of data provided by clients and much of
this law is potentially useful in building a case for advertising agency
liability.
The traditional rule, represented by Ultramares v. Touche,4" was that
an accountant could not be held liable in negligence to third parties for
errors in preparation of a client's financial statements. While this rule
still carries great weight, 42 it has come under such heavy fire in the legal
literature43 that a growing number of jurisdictions are casting Ultramares
39 Id. at 262, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899, 391 P.2d at 171.
40 Id. at 262, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900, 391 P.2d at 171-72 (citation omitted).
41 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 411 (1931). Even here though, liability for fraud and deceit
was permitted.
42 See, e.g., MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367, 370, 199 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1973).
43 See, e.g., Hawkins, Professional Negligence and Liability of Public Accountants,
PRlOFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 256 (T. Roady & W. Andersen ed. 1960); Comment, 44
(Vol. 24:413
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aside in favor of the broader rule represented by Shatterproof Glass v.
James."
The modern rule of Shatterproof Glass is that accountants may be
held liable in negligence to third parties, regardless of any privity con-
cepts, if there has been detrimental reliance on financial reports.4 5 The
court in Shatterproof Glass relied heavily on the tentative drafts of the
Second Restatement of Torts.46 What is particularly interesting about the
facts in Shatterproof Glass is that the plaintiff, in reliance on the defen-
dant's audit, extended credit to a company that subsequently became
insolvent. Thus if the plaintiff could not have turned to the accounting
firm, it would have had no recovery. The same principle might lead an
injured consumer to join an advertising agency in a product liability
action.
Though the principle behind the accountant's liability may be equally
applicable to the advertising agency, there exist two major distinctions.
One, the accountant can usually guess with some degree of certitude
who is likely to rely on his reports, whereas the agency broadcasts its
material to a broad segment of the population at large; and, two, the
accounting profession is plainly in the business of certifying the accuracy
of information, whereas the agency is best known for simply disseininat-
ing information in a convincing manner. These are major distinctions
which should not be discounted. Looked at in another way, however,
the work product of both accountant and agency are intended to ob-
tain identical results where third parties are concerned: convincing the
third party to enter into a relationship with the accountant's or the agency's
client. Is the creditor who relies on a faulty financial statement really
in any different position than the pregnant woman who, in our hypo-
thetical above, relied on a faulty advertisement?
V. CONCLUSION
In the typical products liability action, there is generally a solvent
manufacturer or seller from whom the injured party may recover. One
could speculate that this is the major reason why no agency has ever
been joined - but should not the agency be called to account where there
is no other solvent defendant, or where other reasons prevent an effec-
tive action against the principals, or where justice demands a proper
sharing of liability? The authors believe that this must be answered
affirmatively, and that the potential for advertising agency liability does
in fact exist.
WASH. L. REV. 139 (1968).
44466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). See also Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d
1100 (7th Cir. 1974); Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, 455 F.2d 847
(4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v.
Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Alumna Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493
S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973).
45 466 SW.2d at 880.
46 Id.
1975]
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